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Abstract We study causes and consequences of financial management in house-
holds in the specific case of charitable giving. We test hypotheses using couples in
the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (n = 1,101). We find that more rela-
tionship specific investments lead to deciding on charitable giving as one economic
actor. Furthermore, we find that the partner with the highest relative educational
resources has most decision making power over charitable donations. Separately
deciding couples are smallest charitable donors. Households in which the male
partner decides are largest charitable donors when only larger and more structural
donations are considered. This can be explained by their more conservative reli-
gious denomination.
Re´sume´ Notre e´tude porte sur les causes et les conse´quences de la gestion
financie`re des me´nages pour le cas spe´cifique des dons caritatifs. Nous testons des
hypothe`ses a` travers un panel de quelques couples des Pays-Bas (GINPS) en matie`re
de dons (n = 1,101). Nous trouvons que davantage d’investissements spe´cifiques
relationnels conduisent a` prendre en compte le don caritatif en tant qu’acteur
e´conomique. En outre, nous trouvons que le conjoint au revenu le plus e´leve´ de´tient
le plus de pouvoir de´cisionnel quand il s’agit de faire des dons de charite´. Les
couples qui prennent les de´cisions se´pare´ment sont les donateurs les plus modestes.
Lorsque des dons structurels importants sont envisage´s, les me´nages dans lesquels
l’homme prend les de´cisions sont les donateurs les plus ge´ne´reux. Une confession
religieuse conservatrice peut venir expliquer cette conduite.
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Zusammenfassung Wir untersuchen Gru¨nde und Folgen der Verwaltung der
Haushaltsfinanzen speziell bezogen auf das Spenden fu¨r wohlta¨tige Zwecke. Wir
testen Hypothesen an Paaren im Projekt Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
(n = 1,101). Wir finden, dass Paare bei beziehungsspezifischeren Investitionen eine
Spendenentscheidung als eine o¨konomische Einheit treffen. Außerdem entdecken
wir, dass der Partner mit dem ho¨chsten relativen Bildungsniveau die gro¨ßere
Entscheidungsbefugnis u¨ber wohlta¨tiges Spenden hat. Paare, wo Partner separat
entscheiden, spenden am wenigsten. Haushalte, in denen der ma¨nnliche Partner
entscheidet, sind die gro¨ßten Spender bei gro¨ßeren und strukturelleren Spenden.
Dies kann mit deren Zugeho¨rigkeit zu konservativeren Glaubensgemeinschaften
erkla¨rt werden.
Resumen Hemos estudiado las causas y las consecuencias de la administracio´n
econo´mica de los hogares en el caso especı´fico de las donaciones caritativas.
Probamos diversas hipo´tesis con parejas dentro del Estudio del Panel de las
Donaciones en los Paı´ses Bajos (n = 1,101). El resultado es que las inversiones
especı´ficas de relacio´n llevan a decidir sobre las donaciones caritativas como un
actor econo´mico. Asimismo, hemos descubierto que el co´nyuge con ma´s recursos
educativos tiene ma´s poder de decisio´n sobre las donaciones caritativas. Las parejas
que deciden por separado son donantes de menor envergadura, mientras que los
hogares en los que decide el co´nyuge masculino son donantes de ma´s envergadura,
solo cuando se tienen en cuenta ma´s y mayores donativos estructurales. Esto puede
explicarse por su cara´cter religioso ma´s conservador.
Keywords Financial management  Households  Philanthropy 
Charitable giving  Donations
Introduction
In a focus group study investigating how couples decide on charitable giving,
Burgoyne et al. (2005) quote a participant elaborating on decision making on
charitable donations in his household:
‘It’s only things like direct debits that come under the household budget
because that’s a regular payment that’s paid out of the household total budget
… So that side of it is definitely household decision, so it’s reviewed, almost,
every year when we get the bills and you decide what you’re going to carry on
with or not. The caller at the door or other things is more of individual.’
(Burgoyne et al. 2005, p. 391)
Burgoyne et al. (2005) conclude that this respondent’s statement is typical for the
way in which couples decide on charitable giving. The larger and more structural
donations are decided on jointly, and the smaller incidental donations are based on
individual decisions. In the first section of this study, we investigate whether this
statement is representative for charitable decision making in Dutch households.
Voluntas (2010) 21:240–263 241
123
How do partners in a household make decisions on charitable giving? Do Dutch
couples decide jointly on charitable giving most of the time?
In the second part of this study we focus on the consequences of this charitable
decision making. In study on charitable giving by American households, Andreoni
et al. (2003) find that how partners in households decide on charitable giving
influences the amount they donate. Households in which the male partner single-
handedly decides on charitable giving donate higher amounts than households with
female decision makers. And households in which partners decide jointly are lowest
donors on average. We investigate the effects of financial management in
households on the level of charitable giving in the Netherlands.
These questions are important, as most research on charitable giving assumes that
decisions on donations are household decisions, rather than individual decisions.
Knowing how partners in a household make these decisions, and discover what the
consequences of these decisions are will first of all facilitate better understanding of
the process of making charitable donations. In addition, information on how couples
decide on charitable giving can also be very useful to charitable organizations
attempting to increase fundraising effectiveness. Knowing which partner makes
what kinds of decisions on charitable donations can help fundraisers to more
strategically make requests for donations.
We focus on the Netherlands because of the availability of data with a high
quality measure of financial decision making in households. We use the Giving in
the Netherlands Panel Study 2005 (GINPS05 2005). In GINPS05, 1,474 respondents
reported on both their own and (if applicable) on their partner’s financial decision
making and donating behavior in 2005. In addition, GINPS05 contains the necessary
demographic and socio-economic background variables for this study.
Conceptual Framework
Determinants of Decision Making on Charitable Giving
In their focus group study Burgoyne et al. (2005) conclude that partners in general
decide individually rather than as a couple over smaller incidental donations, like
door-to-door collections, or street collections. The story is different when larger and
more structural donations are considered. In these cases, charitable giving is
considered a ‘normal’ household expenditure. Decisions on these expenditures
follow the ‘normal’ rules for financial decision making in a household. Thus, how a
couple decides on more structural donations depends for a large part on the general
system of financial organization present in a household. In this study, we will focus
on decision making in the case of these somewhat larger and more structural
donations.
Pahl (1983, 1995) and Vogler (2005) have developed a widely used typology of
general financial management in relationships, based upon whether couples operate
as a single or as two separate economic units. According to Pahl and Vogler’s
typology, when couples operate as a single economic unit (which we further refer to
as ‘one economic actor’), the couple can allocate their money using three
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mechanisms: First, couples can arrange family finances according to the whole wage
system, in which all money is managed by one partner, who distributes some
spending money to the other partner. Second, couples can allocate money by means
of the housekeeping allowance system. In this system one spouse—usually the
husband—gives the other partner money to pay for daily household expenditures
and controls the rest of the money. Third, couples can share their income using the
joint pooling system. In this system, partners use a ‘common’ pot to pay for joint
expenses, and take some individual spending money out of this pot.
When couples function as two separate economic units (which we further refer to
as ‘two economic actors’), they can either choose to allocate their money by means
of the partial pooling system or by means of the independent management system.
In the partial pooling system a couple pools some of their income to pay for
collective expenditures, but keeps most of the money separate. In the independent
management system partners keep purses completely separate.
Except a study by Giesen and Kalmijn (1999), no research has been conducted on
general financial management systems in the Netherlands, let alone on financial
decision making in the case of charitable giving. The results by Giesen and Kalmijn
indicate that financial management by Dutch couples can be deduced to the type of
relationship. Married couples pool their income and decide on most finances jointly,
and cohabiting couples have separate accounts and make individual financial
decisions. Additional results show that Dutch couples more often have joint
accounts when they are lower educated, have children, and are politically right
oriented. In this study we will investigate whether these general results resemble
financial decision making with respect to charitable giving.
In general research on financial management in households three theories prevail:
Sunk cost theory, resource theory, and gender role theory (e.g., Treas 1993; Pahl
1995; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003). These three theories all identify different
sets of determinants of financial management in households. We implement these
theories in order to predict the financial management system that couples use for
charitable giving. We start with sunk cost theory.
Sunk cost theory predicts that financial management in households is determined
by the level of relation-specific investments partners have made (Treas 1993). The
more relation-specific investments a couple has made, the more likely it is that they
will pool their money and function as one economic actor. As Treas puts it:
‘Marriage-specific investments call for collectivization’ (Treas 1993, p. 725). The
less relation-specific investments, the higher the probability partners decide
separately on monetary issues. In addition, when the risk of separation is higher,
people will be less inclined to make relationship-specific investments (Heimdal and
Houseknecht 2003; Kenney 2006). Indicators for relation-specific investments are
for example home ownership, and taking care of children.
Results of past research are in line with Treas’ argument about sunk costs.
Couples in which one of the partners has experienced the disruption of a former
relationship—either in the form of a divorce or by the decease of a partner—more
often keep money separate, and thus function as two economic actors (Treas 1993;
Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Vogler et al. 2006). The same holds for cohabiting
couples, who—in contrast to married couples—more often use separate purses
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(Giesen and Kalmijn 1999; Treas and Widmer 2000; Heimdal and Houseknecht
2003; Vogler 2005; Vogler et al. 2008).
From sunk cost theory we predict that couples with more relation-specific
investments (such as home ownership and the number of children) will more often
function as one economic actor. Hence they will use one of the systems in which
partners decide as one actor on financial expenditures in order to make charitable
donations. In addition, we also predict that couples who have previously
experienced a serious relationship disruption will be more careful to make
relationship-specific investments, and prefer to act as two separate economic actors.
From resource theory we can deduce two different predictions about financial
management in households, which depend on either absolute or relative socio-
economic resources. With respect to absolute resources, researchers argue that
higher levels of absolute resources enable partners to achieve goals without the help
of their spouse and give them more bargaining power over financial decisions, such
as charitable donations (Williamson 1975; Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Treas
1993). Woolley (2000) for example showed that when the male partner has a higher
income, he is more likely to control financial management, a result also confirmed
by Richie (1990) in Waseem 2004). Additionally, according to both Vogler (1998)
and Pahl (1983), women who are employed are more likely to have control over
financial management, irrespective of their income. Furthermore, Treas (1993)
found that couples in which the wife works are more likely to have separate
accounts. Therefore, from resource theory we first predict that couples with less
financial and educational resources are more likely to pool income, and hence make
charitable donations as one economic actor.
Relative resource theory predicts who in the relationship has most control over
money, when couples decide as one actor. According to this theory, the level of
control over financial management of a spouse increases with their level of socio-
economic resources or knowledge about finances relative to that of their partner
(Treas 1993; Pahl 1995; Woolley 2000; Andreoni et al. 2003; Kenney 2006). When
a man has a higher income, completed a higher educational level or has significantly
more knowledge of financial matters than his female partner, his control over a
household’s pooled money is larger (Waseem 2004; Kenney 2006). The same
argument is valid for control over financial management by women. When their
income, educational level, or knowledge of financial matters is higher than that of
their male partners, they will have more to say about the household’s pooled money.
When we implement relative resource theory in order to predict the financial
management system couples use for charitable giving, we argue that in the case
where couples make monetary decisions as one actor, the partner with highest level
of financial and educational resources will be in control of the pooled money.
Finally, gender role theory states that traditional views on gender roles may
impose limits to the financial management options of women (Thornton et al. 1983;
Lundberg and Polak 1996; Kenney 2006). In families with more traditional values,
household finances are more likely to be characterized by the allowance system or
by the male controlled pooling system, as handling money is traditionally regarded a
male task (Tichenor 1999). Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2000) shows that in Germany,
traditional gender values indeed lead to a higher likelihood of male controlled
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financial management. Treas and Widmer (2000) studied money management in 23
countries, and find that both the individual approval of women’s employment and
the mean level of women employed in a country have a positive effect on keeping
money separate. Kenney (2006) found that more traditional views on gender roles
increase the likelihood of the use of a male controlled pooling system in the United
States. In contrast, Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) found no effect of gender
values on a couple’s financial management system in both Sweden and the United
States. They gave no explanation for this deviant result. From gender role theory we
predict that couples with more traditional views on gender roles will more often
donate money to charitable causes as one economic actor and have the male partner
decide on these expenditures.
Consequences of Financial Management
In this paragraph we discuss the consequences of different financial management
systems for the amount couples decide to donate to charitable causes. Previous
research on charitable giving by married couples in the United States shows that
households in which the male partner decides on charitable giving make largest
donations to charitable causes. Households in which the female partner decides or
where joint decisions are made are smaller donors (Andreoni et al. 2003). Do these
differences also exist in the Netherlands? And if so, why would different financial
management systems lead to differences in expenditures on charitable giving?
Financial Management as One Economic Actor
We start with arguments about the consequences of managing finances when
couples decide upon expenditures as one economic actor. As discussed, according to
Pahl (1983, 1995) and Vogler (2005) there are three mechanisms along which
couples can arrange financial management as one economic actor: (a) the whole
wage system, (b) the allowance system, and (c) the pooling system.
When couples arrange their finances according to the whole wage system or the
allowance system, one partner controls all financial resources, and hence couples
have no discussion about expenditures. The results by Andreoni et al. (2003) show
that it does matter specifically for the level of charitable giving whether the male or
the female partner controls the whole wage or allowance system. With gender role
theory we can account for this difference. Couples with more traditional gender role
values are more likely to have the male partner in control of financial management.
At the same time, couples with more traditional gender values are also likely to be
members of more conservative denominations (Jansen 2002). And in the Nether-
lands, members of conservative denominations are also known to be large charitable
donors (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). Hence, from gender role theory we predict that
couples arranging financial management as one economic actor by means of the
male controlled whole wage or allowance system are large charitable donors
because of their more conservative religious denomination and the more traditional
gender role values connected to this religion.
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When couples arrange financial management with the pooling system, partners
take spending money out of a common pot, and use the rest of the money to pay for
joint expenses. Using the pooling system, couples can either jointly decide about
charitable giving, or use their personal spending money to make charitable
donations. In the latter case the couple acts as two economical actors, a situation that
is discussed later.
According to signalling theory, partners give each other incentives to donate
higher amounts to charitable organizations. Signalling theory emphasizes the
private benefits for spouses in negotiations on charitable giving. It is well known
that people have a preference to select partners with pro-social attitudes and
personality characteristics on the marriage market (Buss and Barnes 1986; Botwin
et al. 1997), and it is likely that these traits contribute to maintenance of the marital
relationship. In order to maintain a good marital relationship, spouses have an
incentive to appear to each other as cooperative, trusting, empathic, and having high
moral standards (Milinski et al. 2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002). We argue
that spouses use charitable giving strategically in order to signal their pro-sociality
to each other. Donating higher amounts to charitable organizations can signal a
partner’s pro-sociality, but only under the condition that partners agree—at least to
some extent—with each other on donations. It is hard to signal pro-sociality while
donating to organizations that the partner disagrees of. From signalling theory we
predict that having similar preferences for charitable giving will increase the
amount donated to charitable organizations.
Transaction cost theory predicts that most couples will try to make joint financial
decisions in a way that causes them least time and trouble. Partners try to minimize
their transaction costs, which have to do with negotiating and coordination of
financial management (Williamson 1981; Treas 1993; Andreoni et al. 2003).
According to transaction cost theory, when partners jointly decide it matters
whether or not they agree with each other on charitable giving. When partners have
opposing preferences on charitable contributions, the amount of time required to
reach decisions on charitable contributions will be higher. In addition to that, when
partners have opposing tastes, the charitable donation of one partner creates
‘negative externalities’ experienced by the other partner, and this will reduce the
donations of a jointly deciding couple drastically (Andreoni et al. 2003, p. 113). On
the other hand, when partners have similar preferences for charitable giving, it takes
little time to make decisions about the charitable expenditures and this is likely to
benefit the amounts donated to charitable causes. From transaction cost theory we
predict that when jointly deciding couples have similar tastes for giving, this will
increase the amount donated. But when jointly deciding couples have opposing
tastes, this will decrease the amount donated.
Financial Management as Two Economic Actors
When partners function as two separate economic actors, they will make charitable
donations out of their own financial accounts, no matter whether they allocate their
money by means of the partial pooling system or by means of the independent
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management system. According to transaction cost theory separate financial
decision making results in higher levels of giving than financial decision making as
a single actor (Andreoni et al. 2003). This argument is based on the assumptions that
each partner receives utility for making charitable donations, that the utility of each
donated dollar is equal for both partners, and that both jointly and separately
deciding actors strive for the same level of utility.
Assume that $1 equals 1 ‘utility’-unit. When a couple donates €20 jointly (as a
single economic actor), both partners receive 20 utility-units. In a situation where
both partners separately donate €10, the total amount received by the charity is also
€20, but both partners receive only 10 utility-units. In this example, in order to
achieve the same level of utility, separately deciding partners need to donate twice
the amount of couples deciding as one economic actor in order to achieve the same
level of utility. From transaction cost theory we predict that couples deciding as two
economic actors will donate higher amounts than couples deciding as one economic
actor.
Data
The Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
We use data from the third wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
(GINPS05 2005). The GINPS is a bi-annual longitudinal study on charitable giving
and volunteering in the Netherlands, which started in 2001. In May 2006, 1,868
persons were questioned about their donating behavior in 2005. In total, 1,474
respondents (79%) completed the questionnaire, using Computer-Assisted Self-
Administered Interview procedures (CASI).
We are interested in financial decision making in couple households. Therefore,
we selected only households in which respondents are involved in a relationship.1
This selection reduced our sample to 1,103 respondents, of which 892 (81%) are
married, 151 (14%) are unmarried cohabiting, and 60 (5%) are ‘Living Apart
Together’ (LAT; couples in which partners live separately from one another). This
is representative for national figures of types of partnerships in the Netherlands
(Dijkstra and Komter 2004; Eurostat 2005). In addition, we excluded two cases with
a monthly after tax household income over €11,000 from the analyses, because
these cases influenced the results significantly.2 This reduced the sample used in the
analyses to 1,101 cases.
1 97.5% of the respondents are involved in heterosexual relationships, while 19 male respondents and 9
female respondents are involved in same sex relationships. These 28 respondents are included in the
analyses.
2 In the OLS regression analyses Dfbeta for these cases was -0.061 and -0.054. This is higher than
abs(dfbeta) [ 2/sqrt N * abs(dfbeta) [ 2/sqrt 1474 * abs(dfbeta) [ 0.052, which indicates that these
cases are influential outliers, including these two cases in the analyses affects the results significantly.
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Measures of Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable measures whether a couple in general makes decisions
on charitable donations over €10 as one economic actor.3 In order to obtain this
information, we asked respondents whether (a) the respondent and partner make
decisions on charitable giving separately; (b) whether the respondent decides; (c)
whether the respondent’s partner decides or (d) whether the respondent and partner
decide jointly. Couples in which partners decide separately are regarded as deciding
as two economic actors (16%), all others are considered to be deciding as one
economic actor (84%). We included the minimum amount of €10 in the question to
specifically investigate decision making on somewhat larger and more structural
donations, and exclude decision making on incidental small donations (such as
door-to-door or street collections).
The second dependent variable is a measure of financial decision making
authority in the case where couples decide as one economic actor. By combining the
reports on couples’ decision making with the respondents gender, we create
dichotomous variables for the female partner decides (18%), the male partner
decides (10%), or decisions are made jointly (72%).
To investigate the effects of financial management on charitable donations, we
construct the amount of money a household donated to various charitable causes in
2005. We are first and foremost interested in the different effects of decision making
on structural (larger) donations. However, we also want to compare charitable
decision making on larger donations with decision making on total donations.
Therefore, we construct two variables for the amount households donated. The first
variable measures total amount donated in 2005 for all donations. The second
variable is limited to the amount donated for households donating more than €50 in
2005, which likely excludes most households that only make small spontaneous
donations. 702 couple households (64%) have donated over €50 in total in 2005.
The amount of money a household donated in 2005 is measured with questions
on donations to eleven different categories of charitable causes. The questionnaire
uses a survey module that minimizes the risk that people underreport donations.4
First, respondents were questioned about which method they used to make a
donation, for example, a donation canister or a credit slip. After that, for each
category of charitable causes, respondents were asked whether or not their
household had made a donation. Third, the respondents reported the amount donated
in 2005 to each of the categories they indicated having donated to. Out of the
sample of 1,101 households, 258 (23%) did indicate to have made a donation to one
or more specific sub-sector(s), but failed to specify the exact amount. In these cases,
the missing amounts were imputed independently for each charitable sub-sector
using the complete original dataset (N = 1,474). One problem with using multiple
imputation in giving data is that the missing values are not Missing at Random
(MAR), an assumption that needs to be satisfied when imputing missing data
3 It is made clear to the respondents that these decisions refer to separate instances of making donations
(larger than €10) to particular charitable organizations.
4 This survey module is labeled ‘Method-Area’-module in Rooney et al. (2001).
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(Allison 2002). This is problematic, but multiple imputation seems the best solution
for dealing with missing values in giving data. See Brooks (2004) for more
information and a discussion on using multiple imputation in charitable giving data.
Multiple imputation uses linear predictions, which can result in negative donations.
This is a minor problem, as after imputation only 1% of the donations are negative.
In line with Schafer (1997) we substitute all donations below 1 with a donation of
€1. This enables us to calculate and use the natural log of the total amount donated
and the natural log of total amount donated for households donating more than €50
as third and fourth dependent variable.
Measures of Predictor Variables
Difference in educational level between husband and wife is composed by
subtracting the wife’s education from that of the husband’s. Mean educational level
consists of the sum of the educational level of both partners, divided by two.
Educational level of both partners is measured on a seven-point scale, with (1) only
primary education; (2) primary education and some vocational school; (3) lower
secondary education; (4) middle secondary education; (5) higher secondary
education; (6) higher vocational education; (7) higher tertiary education.5
Difference in monthly after-tax income (in €1,000) between husband and wife is
composed by subtracting the wife’s income from that of the husband’s.6 Mean
income in €1,000 consists of the sum of monthly after-tax income of both partners,
divided by two. Monthly after-tax income is measured for both the respondent and
partner by asking for the exact amount each partner earned net per month in 2005,
for eight different sources of income (including income from a paid job, and income
from various benefits). When respondents would not give their exact net monthly
income from these sources, for each source they were given eight categories to
indicate the level of their or their partner’s income. We summed all sources of
income for each respondent and their partners in order to acquire a variable for net
monthly household income. This method resulted in less than 1% missing values on
the income variables, which were replaced with the mean income on the specific
source of income.
Respondents were prompted about their traditional views on gender roles with
three–five-point Likert scale items: (1) ‘A working mother can be just as good a
mother as a mother who stays at home for her children’ (reversed); (2) ‘It is not right
if a man stays at home and a woman has a paid job’; (3) ‘It is the task of a man to
earn money and the task of a woman to care for children’. Cronbach’s alpha for
these three items is 0.704.
In addition we include religious affiliation in the analyses, as we know that this is
a strong determinant of traditional norms on gender roles (Jansen 2002). Households
belonging to strict Protestant denominations are more likely to have traditional
views of gender roles. We questioned respondents about their own religious
5 There are two missing values for educational level of the partner, which were substituted by the mean
educational level, middle secondary education.
6 We do not take the distribution of the tax effects of being married into account.
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denomination and that of their partner. With this information we computed variables
indicating whether the partners form a strict Protestant couple (13%), with non-
religious couples and couples belonging to other—less strict—denominations
(Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed Protestant) as the reference category. In the
Netherlands there are several strict Protestant Christian denominations, which either
are part of, or split off of the Rereformed Protestant Church. These congregations
are mainly located in small towns in the upper-half of the country, in the province of
Zeeland and in the Veluwe, also known as the ‘Biblebelt’. Members of these
congregations live according to strict religious rules, for instance, they are not
allowed to use any means of transportation on Sundays and they visit church at least
twice on that day. Among these people traditional gender roles are strictly enforced.
We control for church attendance in times a year.
We measured the level of consensus on philanthropic donations in the household
with the question whether respondents usually agree with their partner on deciding
on charitable giving. Response categories include: (1) I do not interfere in donating
at all (8%); (2) we mostly disagree (2%); (3) sometimes we agree and sometimes we
disagree (11%); (4) we mostly agree (41%); (5) we always agree (38%). We merged
response categories 4 and 5, so that four new categories were created: respectively
indicating being indifferent (response category 1), having opposing tastes (response
category 2), having fluctuating tastes (response category 3), and having (more or
less) similar tastes with respect to philanthropic donations (response categories 4
and 5; reference category).
As indicators for sunk costs, we include information on home ownership (69%),
number of children in the household (l = 1.8, r = 1.4), and whether the
respondent has ever experienced a divorce (8%).
Control variables include respondents’ age (under 35 and over 65 years, with
between 35 and 65 as reference category) and the dichotomous variable female
(53%) to indicate whether the respondent is female. Table 1 gives an overview of all
variables used in the analyses.
Results
Descriptive Results
Figure 1 displays the amount Dutch households donated to all charitable causes
(separately for total donations and for donations over €50), depending on how
decisions on charitable giving are made in couple households.
Households in which the male partner decides on gifts are the largest donors,
with an average total donation of €381. With a mean total donation of €280,
households in which partners decide separately on gifts donate less. Households, in
which joint decisions are made, are comparable to separately deciding couples with
respect to their total donations. Their average donation is €282. Households in
which the female partner decides are the smallest donors. Their average donation is
€127 lower than male deciding households, €254. Who decides on charitable giving
produces similar effects for both total donations and donations over €50. The only
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small difference is that for households donating more than €50, the separately
deciding households donate more than the joint deciders.
Who Decides?
Table 2 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis on whether or not couples
decide on charitable donations over €10 as one economic actor. In addition, Table 2
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for study variables (GINPS05)
Variable Obs. Mean S.E. Min. Max.
Decision making as one economic actor 1,101 0.84 – 0 1
Financial decision making authoritya
Male decides 928 0.10 – 0 1
Female decides 928 0.18 – 0 1
Couple decides jointly 928 0.72 – 0 1
Total household donationb 1,101 4.31 1.88 0 8.52
Total household donation over €50c 702 5.43 1.08 3.93 8.52
Marital status
Married 1,101 0.81 – 0 1
Cohabiting 1,101 0.14 – 0 1
Living apart together 1,101 0.05 – 0 1
Divorced 1,101 0.09 – 0 1
Church attendanced 1,101 6.70 21.33 0 104
Strict Protestant couple 1,101 0.13 – 0 1
Traditional gender role values 1,101 2.14 0.80 1 5
Tastes in giving
Indifferent tastes 1,101 0.08 – 0 1
Opposing tastes 1,101 0.02 – 0 1
Fluctuating tastes 1,101 0.11 – 0 1
Similar tastes 1,101 0.79 – 0 1
Mean educational level couple 1,101 3.94 1.40 1 7
Educational differencee 1,101 0.24 1.54 -5 5
Mean income couplef 1,101 1.10 0.54 0 5
Income differenceg 1,101 0.79 1.02 -4.05 5.50
Female 1,101 0.52 – 0 1
Age under 35 1,101 0.23 – 0 1
Aged between 35 and 65 1,101 0.58 – 0 1
Age over 65 1,101 0.17 – 0 1
Children 1,101 1.84 1.36 0 10
Home ownership 1,101 0.69 – 0 1
a Decision making as one economic actor, separate deciding households (N = 173) are excluded;
b ln(total household donation); c ln(total household donation if over €50); d church attendance in times a
year; e educational level husband - educational level wife; f mean income couple/1,000; g (income
husband - income wife)/1,000; descriptive statistics based on first imputed dataset
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displays the results of a multinomial logistic regression analysis on who decides on
charitable donations over €10, in the case where couples make charitable decisions
as one economic actor.
The absolute resource hypothesis states that couples with lower levels of
resources have a higher need for pooling money, and hence make decisions on
charitable giving as one actor. We find no support for this hypothesis, as there is no
effect from financial or educational resources on couples making charitable
decisions as one economic actor.
Furthermore, from sunk cost theory we deduced the hypothesis that the more
relationship-specific investments a couple has made, the higher the probability that
decisions on charitable giving are made as one actor. The results in Table 2 show
partly support for this hypothesis. Home ownership has a positive effect on deciding
as one economic actor, but there is no significant effect of the number of children on
deciding as one economic actor. From sunk cost theory we also predicted that
couples having previously experienced a serious relationship disruption prefer to act
as two separate economic actors. We find support for this hypothesis, as the results
show that respondents who have experienced a divorce have a larger probability of
deciding on charitable giving as two economic actors.
The results of the control variables in Table 2 show that church attendance
increases the probability of deciding as one economic actor, while there is no effect
of belonging to a strict Protestant denomination or having more traditional gender
role values. We also investigated whether different tastes for giving effect deciding
as one economic actor. Although we only formulated hypotheses on the effects of
tastes for giving on the amount donated to charitable organizations, it could also be
the case that different tastes for giving influence the charitable decision making
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process. This latter effect is only limited. Only having fluctuating tastes has a
negative effect on deciding as one economic actor, compared to having similar
tastes (at p B 0.10). Couples with indifferent or opposing tastes decide as often as
couples with similar tastes as one economic actor. Furthermore, female gender and
age do not effect deciding as one economic actor.
The four columns on the right-hand side in Table 2 show the results of a
multinomial logistic regression analysis on who decides on charitable donations
over €10, in the case where couples make charitable decisions as one economic
Table 2 Results of logistic and multinomial logistic regression analysis, who in a couple household
decides on donations over €10 (GINPS05)
All couples (n = 1,101) Couples deciding as one economic actor
(n = 928)
Logit coefficients (B) Multinomial logit coefficientsa (B)
Deciding as one
economic actor
S.E. Female/male
decides
S.E. Joint/male
decides
S.E.
Married (ref.) – – – – – –
Cohabiting 0.042 0.272 -0.411 0.418 -1.070** 0.360
Living apart together 0.132 0.406 0.260 0.621 -1.603** 0.585
Mean educational
level couple
-0.102 0.071 0.113 0.118 0.036 0.104
Educational
differenceb
-0.047 0.059 -0.375** 0.097 -0.328** 0.083
Mean income couplec -0.091 0.175 -0.204 0.295 -0.182 0.260
Income differenced 0.038 0.090 0.040 0.148 0.098 0.129
Children 0.101 0.076 0.146 0.112 -0.123 0.097
Home ownership 0.425* 0.195 -0.012 0.341 -0.377 0.293
Divorced -0.571* 0.270 -0.591 0.470 -0.328 0.408
Strict Protestant couple -0.086 0.294 -1.536** 0.473 -0.688* 0.341
Traditional gender role
values
-0.178 0.116 -0.262 0.188 -0.149 0.160
Church attendancee 0.014* 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.006
Similar tastes (ref.) – – – – – –
Indifferent tastes -0.185 0.300 0.282 0.384 -1.984** 0.373
Opposing tastes 0.059 0.647 0.444 0.715 -1.761* 0.726
Fluctuating tastes -0.437(?) 0.248 0.166 0.494 0.162 0.426
Female 0.279 0.173 1.060** 0.293 0.090 0.246
Aged under 35 0.192 0.250 -0.485 0.407 0.058 0.351
Aged over 65 -0.100 0.246 -0.612 0.407 -0.409 0.330
Constant 1.995** 0.474 0.682 0.795 3.636** 0.676
(?) p B 0.10; * p B 0.05; ** p B 0.01
a Reference category for the equation is man is decision maker; b educational level husband - educa-
tional level wife; c mean income couple/1,000; d (income husband - income wife)/1,000; e church
attendance in times a year
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actor. Couples deciding as two economic actors are not considered in this analysis.
The results in Table 2 compare couples in which the female partner decides with
couples in which the male partner decides and jointly deciding couples with
households in which the male partner decides.
From relative resource theory we deduced the hypothesis that the partner with
more socio-economic resources has more power in decision making on charitable
contributions. Results in Table 2 indicate that a partner’s relative educational
resources indeed matter for charitable decision making authority. When a male
partner has a relative higher educational level, he has a higher probability of
deciding on charitable giving. And vice versa for the female partner. There is no
effect of partners’ relative financial resources on decision making authority.
The gender role hypothesis states that the male partner is more likely to decide on
charitable giving in couples with more traditional views on gender roles. The results
in Table 2 show that in couples belonging to strict Protestant denominations the
male partner indeed has a much higher probability to decide on charitable giving.
We find no significant effect of traditional gender roles on decision making in
households, although the effects are in the expected direction.
Another interesting result from the multinomial regression analysis is that
married couples have a higher probability of making joint decisions than both
cohabiting and LAT-couples. This result does not support the conclusion drawn
from the analysis of deciding as one economic actor in Table 2. Apparently, more
relationship-specific investments specifically in the form of marriage lead to
deciding jointly.
The control variables show that having opposing or indifferent tastes for giving
decreases the probability that couples decide jointly, compared to having similar
tastes. This is interesting, apparently partners who know they do not agree with each
other, or who do not care about giving avoid transaction costs for charitable giving
by not deciding jointly. There is no effect of the number of children, home
ownership, having experienced a divorce, church attendance, and age on who
decides on charitable giving in the case of decision making as one economic actor.
A last result from Table 2 we want to point out is the large significant effect of
the gender of the respondent on the gender of the partner in charge of charitable
decision making. This indicates that the partner, who filled out the questionnaire, is
the partner that reports to make the most decisions on charitable giving in the
household. It is likely that this partner is also the most informed on charitable giving
in the household, which hopefully resulted in more reliable data.
Explanations for the Consequences of Financial Management
Consequences of Financial Management for Total Donations
Table 3 shows the results of OLS regression analyses on the natural log of the total
amount all couple households donated to charitable organizations in 2005. Model 3a
in Table 3 includes only decision making authority. Separately deciding households
donate significantly less to charitable organizations than households with male
254 Voluntas (2010) 21:240–263
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decision makers. Using additional Wald tests, we find no difference between female
deciding and joint deciding couples (Wald test v2 = 0.80, p = 0.37). We do find
significant differences in the amounts donated between female and separate
Table 3 Results of OLS regression analyses on the natural log of the total amount donated to charitable
causes by all Dutch couple households in 2005 (GINPS05; based on nine imputed datasets)
All couple households (n = 1,101)
Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Male decides (ref.) – – – – – – – –
Female decides -0.035 0.259 0.170 0.244 -0.399 0.257 0.168 0.235
Couple decides jointly -0.186 0.217 -0.118 0.201 -0.290 0.231 -0.103 0.206
Separate decisions -0.503* 0.253 -0.274 0.235 -0.596* 0.254 -0.307 0.224
Church attendancea 0.022** 0.003 0.020** 0.003
Strict Protestant couple 1.275** 0.189 1.265** 0.178
Traditional gender role
values
-0.201** 0.069 -0.114(?) 0.069
Similar tastes (ref.) – – – –
Indifferent tastes -0.896** 0.258 -0.619** 0.226
Opposing tastes -0.187 0.517 0.304 0.452
Fluctuating tastes -0.620 0.295 0.241 0.259
Jointly decide with
similar tastes (ref.)
– – – –
Jointly decide with
opposing tastes
-0.846 0.984 -1.521(?) 0.851
Jointly decide with
fluctuating tastes
-0.274 0.389 -0.549 0.344
Jointly decide with
indifferent tastes
-0.374 0.484 -0.367 0.418
Divorced -0.517** 0.177
Mean educational level
couple
0.235** 0.042
Educational differenceb -0.019 0.036
Mean income couplec 0.407** 0.115
Income differenced 0.052 0.055
Female 0.026 0.106
Aged under 35 -0.438** 0.140
Aged over 65 0.640** 0.153
Children 0.086* 0.043
Home ownership 0.384** 0.112
Constant 4.511** 0.204 4.519** 0.249 4.704** 0.215 2.603** 0.336
R square 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.31
(?) p B 0.10; * p B 0.05; ** p B 0.01
a Church attendance in times a year; b educational level husband - educational level wife; c mean
income couple/1,000; d (income husband - income wife)/1,000
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deciding couples (Wald test v2 = 4.93, p = 0.03) and between joint and separate
deciding couples (Wald test v2 = 3.64, p = 0.06). Separately deciding couples
donate significantly lower amounts than couples with other decision making
strategies. This is not what would be expected from the transaction cost hypothesis
as formulated by Andreoni et al. (2003). According to this transaction costs
hypothesis separate financial decision making (as two economic actors) results in
higher levels of giving than financial decision making as a single actor.
The gender role hypothesis predicts that male deciding couples donate higher
amounts because of their more conservative religious denomination and the more
traditional gender role values connected to this religion. In model 3b in Table 3 we
include belonging to a strict Protestant denomination, having more traditional
gender role values and church attendance as indicators for traditional gender role
characteristics. These indicators suppress the significant difference in giving
between separate deciding and male deciding households, and between joint
deciding and separate deciding households. However, the inclusion of more
traditional gender role characteristics result in a new significant difference in level
of giving between female and joint deciding couples (Wald test v2 = 3.31,
p = 0.07). The significant difference between female and separately deciding
couples remains significant in model 3b (Wald test v2 = 5.12, p = 0.02). Once we
control for traditional gender role characteristics, female deciding households are
more generous than separate and joint deciding households.
Next, we consider the effect of tastes for giving in model 3c in Table 3. From
signalling theory we derived the hypotheses that similarity in tastes for giving lead
to higher charitable donations, because partners use giving in order to signal their
pro-sociality. The results show that similar tastes for giving lead to higher
donations. However, couples with similar tastes for giving only donate significantly
more money than couples with indifferent tastes for giving. From transaction cost
theory we predicted that similar tastes in giving have a positive effect on giving
when couples decide jointly. Also, from transaction cost theory we derived the
hypothesis that when jointly deciding couples have opposing tastes this lowers the
amount donated. The interaction effects of jointly deciding and opposing,
fluctuating, and indifferent tastes for giving do not differ significantly from the
interaction between jointly deciding and similar tastes. At the same time, after the
inclusion of tastes for giving, differences between decision making authorities
remain. Specifically, the separately deciding couples donate significantly less
compared to all other couples. Separately deciding households give less than male
deciding households (see model 3c in Table 3), female deciding households (Wald
test v2 = 6.85, p = 0.01), and jointly deciding households (Wald test v2 = 2.97,
p = 0.09). Hence, the results in model 3c in Table 3 show no support for the
transaction costs hypothesis.
After the inclusion of all predictor and control variables in model 3d in Table 3,
still two differences in effects of decision making authority on charitable giving
remain. Female deciding households donate higher amounts than jointly deciding
households (Wald test v2 = 2.83, p = 0.09) and separately deciding households
(Wald test v2 = 6.19, p = 0.01). Model 3b in Table 3 shows that this effect is
caused by the inclusion of traditional gender role characteristics. Another interesting
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result in the complete model is the significant interaction effect of jointly deciding
and opposing tastes. Couples deciding jointly with opposing tastes for giving donate
lower amounts than jointly deciding couples with similar tastes. This result provides
support for the transaction cost hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that jointly
deciding couples with opposing tastes donate lower amounts.
Furthermore, in the complete model in Table 3 there is a positive effect of church
attendance, belonging to a strict Protestant religious denomination, mean educa-
tional level, mean income, age, the number of children, and home ownership on
total amount donated to charitable organizations. Traditional gender role values,
having indifferent tastes for giving, and having experienced a divorce negatively
effect total charitable giving.
Consequences of Financial Management for Donations over €50
Next, we discuss the effect of decision making authority on the level of giving, for
donations over €50. The results in model 4a in Table 4 show that when only larger
donations are considered, female deciding households donate significantly lower
amounts to charitable organizations than male deciding households. Using
additional Wald tests, we find no other significant differences between decision
making authorities in amount donated over €50.
In model 4b in Table 4, we include the indicators for traditional gender role
characteristics. After this inclusion, the difference in charitable donations between
male and female deciding households disappears. Both belonging to a strict
Protestant religious denomination and church attendance have a positive effect on
charitable donations. There is no effect of traditional gender role values on the
amount households donate to charitable organizations, when considering only
donations over €50. Additional analyses reveal that specifically belonging to a strict
Protestant religious denomination explains the higher donations by male deciding
households compared to female deciding households.7 These results provide
additional support for the gender role hypothesis, specifically in the case of larger
([€50) donations.
In model 4c in Table 4 we include different tastes for giving. Whether partners
have similar or opposing tastes do not matter for the amount households give,
considering they donate more than €50. When controlled for tastes for giving, male
deciding households still donate significantly higher amounts than female deciding
households. These results do not support the hypotheses derived from both
signalling theory and transaction costs theory, for donations over €50.
In the complete model in Table 4 (model 4d), the results resemble the findings in
models 3b and 3c. There are no differences between decision making authorities in
amounts donated over €50. However, in contrast to model 3b, in model 4d there is a
slightly significant positive effect of traditional gender role values on donating over
€50. This is both interesting and puzzling, as there is a negative effect of traditional
7 After separate introduction of negative gender role values and church attendance female deciding
households still donate significantly less to charitable organizations than male deciding households
(at p B 0.10). The separate introduction of strict protestant couple to the model leaves no significant
difference between male and female deciding households.
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gender role values on total donations. Furthermore, there are positive effects of
mean level of education, age, the number of children, and being home owner on
amount donated over €50.
Table 4 Results of OLS regression analyses on the natural log of the amount donated over €50 to
charitable causes by Dutch couple households in 2005 (GINPS05; based on nine imputed datasets)
Couple households with a total donation over €50 (n = 702)
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Male decides (ref.) – – – – – – – –
Female decides -0.349* 0.175 -0.159 0.161 -0.337(?) 0.175 -0.142 0.156
Couple decides jointly -0.235 0.151 -0.176 0.137 -0.250 0.155 -0.129 0.134
Separate decisions -0.273 0.180 -0.099 0.162 -0.283 0.181 -0.115 0.156
Church attendancea 0.012** 0.002 0.011** 0.002
Strict protestant couple 0.523** 0.110 0.568** 0.106
Traditional gender role
values
0.043 0.051 0.097(?) 0.053
Similar tastes (ref.) – – – –
Indifferent tastes -0.188 0.205 -0.135 0.180
Opposing tastes -0.234 0.397 -0.053 0.353
Fluctuating tastes 0.017 0.225 0.198 0.194
Jointly decide with
similar tastes (ref.)
– – – –
Jointly decide with
opposing tastes
-0.179 0.740 -0.659 0.646
Jointly decide with
fluctuating tastes
-0.145 0.286 -0.372 0.247
Jointly decide with
indifferent tastes
0.284 0.441 0.007 0.385
Divorced -0.127 0.140
Mean educational level
couple
0.185** 0.032
Educational differenceb -0.017 0.026
Mean income couplec 0.018 0.079
Income differenced 0.032 0.039
Female 0.044 0.076
Aged under 35 -0.188(?) 0.180
Aged over 65 0.367** 0.102
Children 0.081** 0.030
Home ownership 0.181* 0.089
Constant 5.671** 0.142 5.263** 0.172 5.701** 0.146 3.987** 0.240
R square 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.31
(?) p B 0.10; * p B 0.05; ** p B 0.01
a Church attendance in times a year; b educational level husband - educational level wife; c mean
income couple/1,000; d (income husband - income wife)/1,000
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Conclusion and Discussion
What are the causes and consequences of financial decision making in households in
the case of charitable giving? This study shows that 84% of the Dutch couples
decide on charitable giving as one economic actor. The most popular charitable
decision making strategy is joint deciding. 61% of the Dutch couples decide jointly
on charitable donations over €10. For all these couples, charitable giving is a
household activity. This result legitimizes surveys on charitable giving investigating
household giving, rather than individual giving. It also seems reasonable to question
only one partner about the household’s giving, as 84% of the partners in couple
households will have knowledge on their household’s donations.
We found support for the theory of sunk costs, as couples with more relationship-
specific investments more often decide as one economic actor.8 In addition, married
couples are most likely to decide jointly, compared to cohabiting and LAT couples.
For the latter two types of relationships, no specific decision making patterns
emerged. This is not in line with results reported on financial management by
households in the Netherlands (Giesen and Kalmijn 1999). Giessen and Kalmijn
(1999) found that in 1995 in the Netherlands cohabiting couples more often have
separate accounts and make individual financial decisions than married couples. An
explanation for this deviant result could be the general shift from marriage towards
cohabiting in the Netherlands. For younger cohorts in the Netherlands, cohabitation
more and more serves as an alternative for marriage, hence cohabiting and married
couples are increasingly more alike (Liefbroer and Dykstra 2000; Steenhof and
Harmsen 2002). Financial decision making in cohabiting and married households
could therefore also be more alike in 2005 than in 1995.
We found no support for the absolute resource theory. There is no effect from
financial or educational resources on couples making charitable decisions as one
economic actor. Apparently, people do not decide as one economic actor out of the
need for pooled income. We found partly support for the relative resource theory. A
partner’s relative educational level increases the probability that he or she decides
on charitable giving. Interestingly enough, we did not find this effect for a partner’s
relative income level. Andreoni et al. (2003) did report a positive effect of the male
partner being primary earner on having the male partner decide on charitable giving.
Maybe it is not the absolute difference in income between partners that matters, but
who is the primary earner. All in all, in our study only a partner’s relative
educational resources affect charitable decision making authority.
Furthermore, we found support for gender role theory. Couples belonging to a
more conservative religious denomination have a higher probability of having the
male partner decide on the household’s charitable giving. However, we found no
effect of having more traditional gender role values. Maybe the measure we used for
traditional gender roles should have also considered values regarding handling
money. The items on traditional gender roles in GINPS05 only concern values with
respect to taking care of children and having paid work. It can be argued that
traditional values on financial management differ to some extent from values on
8 Although we did not find the expected effect of having more children on deciding jointly.
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taking care of children and having paid work. It is likely that this matters
specifically in the case of charitable giving. Charitable donations by religious
couples are, for example, often made in church. Many people can see this public act
of giving, and it is likely that traditional values regarding handling money effect
which partner donates, and thus very likely decides on charitable giving.
Next, we turn to the consequences of charitable decision making. A new and
important result reported in this study are the different effects of decision making
authority on charitable giving, depending on whether total or only larger donations
are considered. When all donations are considered, separately deciding households
donate the lowest amounts. This is contrary to what we expected from transaction
cost theory. We expected that separately deciding partners would need to donate
higher amounts to experience the same level of utility from donations as couples
deciding as one economic actor. When considering total donations, we did find
some support for another hypothesis derived from transaction cost theory. Jointly
deciding couples with opposing tastes donate less, as donations by one partner likely
create negative externalities experienced by the other partner. Fussing about giving
decreases amount donated, when deciding jointly. The results on decision making
patterns showed that couples avoid these negative externalities: couples with
indifferent or opposing tastes have a lower probability of deciding jointly.
It is interesting that we found no support for transaction cost theory and
signalling theory, when we only considered donations over €50. Only when we
considered all donations, indifferent tastes lead to significant lower donations than
similar tastes. We argue that this can be explained by the fact that smaller donations
are usually made under some form of social pressure. Solicitors approach donors
and ask them for a small gift face to face. It is very likely that these small donations
are not inspired by the donor’s personal preferences for a charitable organization.
These petty gifts are rather motivated by the social pressure created by the solicitor,
than by preferences for giving. Hence, partners that only make small donations are
likely to have indifferent tastes for giving.
We found strong support for gender role theory in both the analysis of total and
higher donations. Once traditional gender role characteristics are held constant for,
female deciding households are more generous than separate and joint deciding
households in the case of total donations. In the case of donations over €50, male
deciding households no longer donated higher amounts compared to female deciding
households after traditional gender role characteristics are held constant for.
What can charitable organizations learn from these results? First, when
approaching couples for donations, specifically married couples will be more likely
to want to decide jointly on their level of charitable giving. Fund-raisers should give
married couples some time and space to be able to decide jointly. Second, our
results show that the partner with the highest educational level has most decision
making power. This is the partner that should be approached when asking for
charitable donations. Third, it is very likely that the male partner decides on
charitable giving in couples belonging to a more conservative religious denomi-
nation. In these couples fundraisers will be more successful when approaching the
male partner. This is especially important, as these couples are generally large
donors.
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And finally, how do these results relate to financial decision making in general?
The findings on charitable decision making in this study resemble findings in
general research on financial management in households. In most studies on income
organization in households, joint management is the dominant strategy. For
example, Treas (1993) finds that 64% of the American couples have joint bank
accounts in 1984. In another study, Treas and Widmer (2000) investigate money
management in 23 countries. Their results show that in Canada, the country in
which couples have least often joint accounts, still 64% of the couples have joint
accounts. Of course there are many differences between the specific case of
charitable decision making and financial decisions in general. However, we argue
that there are some general conclusions that can be drawn from this study. First, our
results confirm previous research stating that partners having experienced previ-
ously marital disruption will more often decide separately on financial matters.
Second, we confirm previous findings in support of relative resource theory. The
partner with the highest educational level has most financial decision making power.
And finally, we found support for gender role theory. Our results show that
traditional views on gender roles certainly impose limits to the financial
management options of women. In families belonging to more conservative
religious denominations, handling money is still regarded a male task. Our study
shows that this is the case for both smaller and larger financial decisions.
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